DC-10: Dangerous or Misunderstood?

I loved flying the DC-10-40, having nearly 5,000 hours in the left seat. Comfortable cockpit, low noise level, great visibility. When I went to the 747 Classic I felt like I was in a cave and the noise level was quite high by comparison. Great airplane though. Nearly 11,000 hours in that one.

The -40 with the PW engines had a different engine pylon/mount system but was still grounded, along with all the other DC-10 models, after AA 191 happened. Langhorn Bond's decree.

I had a problem with outboard slats vibrating and moving in/out several inches a couple of times which was due to incorrect (low) cable tension in the drive system. And they did not "lock" in position which was unfortunate.

I also had an incorrect stall warning on initial climb which caused the Auto Slat system to extend the Outboard Slats. Oh, and I had a failure (broke apart) of a Reversible Motor Pump which cause a dual hydraulic failure. That got my attention and prompted a "land at nearest suitable" situation.

Just my recollections I thought some might find interesting, and I've enjoyed reading everyone's comments here.

Convair/General Dynamics had been selected to make the fuselage sections. Their engineering staff warned McDac that there was a potential for a floor failure if a cargo door came off and if that happened they would expect the loss of the aircraft. This was ignored because of the extra cost involved in redesigning the cargo door latching mechanism and the company feared AA would not want any delay getting their aircraft into the air. The letter came out during the litigation after the Paris crash of 1974.
The biggest problem was with the "bean-counters" from McDonnell in charge, trying to "teach" the old Douglas folks how to make money with an airframe, designed-in safety was not given priority. They were in such a hurry to get the design done they cut-corners. They did not provide enough redundancy and the design was inferior to the L-1011.
People like to make snarky comments about the old Douglas folks, but, it was the McDonnell folks who "cheapened" the products and after the merger, they were in charge!
There really was only enough room for one aircraft in that market at the time. It should have been the L-1011, BUT, Lockheed stumbled when they did not provide a model with extended range without loss of payload. And there was a lot of politics involved. If McDac had skipped the opportunity they might have gone out of producing commercial airframes altogether and the airlines were loath to loose the competition.

I always preferred the L-1011 and got to fly jump seat from Tel Aviv to Charles de Gaulle.

A little of both. Boeing defined the game with the 747, Lockheed upped the antie with the L1011 while going for best-of-breed (considering engineering excellence, build quality, and state of the art feature set, it is hard to argue with their results), and once-dominant Douglas, tired of playing tail-end-charlie in sales went for most-profitable-to-buy-lease-&-operate. Granted, the hydraulic layout under #2 was a bit bone-headed, and the engine mounts could have benefitted from engineering simulation software available a decade later. Even the Cargo Door issue had its origin in a mechanical relationship that was both expensive and difficult to detect. So, 'for the time' and given the design goals, the life history of the DC-10/MD-11 airframe has little for which to apologize. Most of the rest of the "unfortunate decisions" regarding that design can be attributed to the circumstances of its unfortunate timing. The engineering phase opened with the corporate "competition" (the DC-9) selling like popcorn at a Saturday matinee. When accounting changed the sign of DC-9 profits and McDonnell had to rescue the whole company, the DC-10 project was under even more pressure to sell in quantity AND deliver profit. The DC-10/MD-11 team did not have an opportunity to catch up until after the turn of the century. Have a little sympathy for the guys in the trenches. It is also worth noting that there are over a hundred of them still in service.

Also they were incorrect in placing the blame for Chicago solely on American Airlines mechanics. The failure did not destroy the slats - it ruptured the hydraulic lines to the slats. With loss of fluid, the slats retracted resulting in asymmetrical lift. MD needed to design a means to insure the slats would not retract in the event of hydraulic line rupture. Very poor research by the author.

My late father in his latter years of employment with BA, was re-trained from VC-10s to the DC-10-30. BA had made an agreement with ANZ to fly their aircraft LHR-LAX return as a BA/ANZ codeshare and ANZ continued this flight onto Auckland from LAX. ANZ did not have rights to fly to the UK at that time.
He loved the aircraft and said it was special, however after these incidents, he was aware that many passengers refused to board it, especially in LAX when they having booked a BA ticket were expecting a VC-10 or B747 and on seeing a DC-10 when boarding returned and refused to fly on that aircraft.

It was an aircraft that was likely pushed through production too quickly and its defects ended up being worked out while the aircraft was carrying passengers and cargo.

The "Death Craft".... Douglas did not even have a cocktail napkin idea of a twin aisle tri-jet when Locheed announced the Tristar but their -10 was the first to fly,,
No blow out panels between compartments below deck caused the main deck floor to collapse/deform after losing the bulk bin door leading to the loss of control to the tail surfaces for one. The construction standard at the time allowed parallel running of hydraulic system plumbing side by side along with no hydraulic fuses in the leading edge devices lead to the loss of AA 191/ORD, This same weak regulation also lead to the loss of UAL in SUX when the uncontained engine failure occurred in #2 motor. Many good articles were written describing these along with FAA responsibility regarding. The FAA like many federal agencies depend on manufacturer engineering conclusions and integrity as their staff is not large enough or prepared to do simultaneous testing and evaluations.

Delta leased DC-10s for a short period to fill their lift needs but only tempo until the delayed Tri-Star was delivered and then the 10s went away,,,,

The Tri Star was a much better mouse trap right out of the box me thinks.

It's a shame. This was a great plane, and a pleasure to fly on. Once the baggage door issues were resolved, it should have been fine.
But the news media sensed MONEY and demonized the airplane, killing the company in the process.
And we bemoan the lack of competition. Small wonder.

I would have to go with misunderstood. I think that once the cargo door issue was resolved there was not really a design issue at that point. However, the Chicago crash was caused by shoddy maintenance and not any issues with the aircraft. However, when Fedex had 2 crashes involving the MD-11, I wonder if the fact it resembled the DC-10 may have caused people to assume it was directly related.

Spent 11 yr instructing/ flying DC-10-30s out of Canada to Europe, Japan, S.America 1979-1990, yes, a/c suffered design flaws which were addressed.
Was a terrific a/c to fly with great performance & range.
One of my favourites.

Without question this was my favorite aircraft. I began flying in 1973 and tried to get on a flight using this aircraft whenever possible.

On the other hand, N306FE survived far beyond what it was designed for during the attempted hijacking & suicide attempt by a disgruntled & suicidal FedEx employee during Federal Express Flight 705 in April 1994.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Express_Flight_705

I firmly believe that a competitor generated the hype on this aircraft; and Douglas was not the only company to suffer that way. As a footnote the 747 also suffered with freight door problems.

Meanwhile - the USAF (and other countries) still operate several dozen KC-10s with no issues, and will continue to do so since the KC-46 can't seem to reliably maintain an operational readiness status.

The Article fails to mention the the DC-10 in Sioux City with the #2 Engine Uncontained Failure and severing all 3 Hydraulic systems. Since they did not have any Hydraulic Fuses they lost all hydraulics and did not have cable backup and had to land with differential thrust. This in my opinion is a bigger flaw than the door, b and the crew did a great job of landing the plane considering that no one would have ever thought to write a procedure for such an incident.. Major over site in this article.

The Media has a reputation of destroying everything. Half truths, along with out and out lies. Prejudicial non facts and the need to sell death and destruction. The destruction of a company is more newsworthy than talking about a man or a woman who has done great things for the world.

Dc 10 ship 1
I was in QC, then on a special team checking all doors. We were the only people who could certify the door rigging
None of you has an iota of truth and live in complete ignorance of why the Paris crash occurred. It was not all design, folks that was the first plane delivered our five man crew did not certify. Same problem occurred over Canada, coffin sucked out of what we referred to as the mail door. Skinny and hard to rig. I could tell a lo here but people think it’s nuts…. Real reason was, and check the timing, Douglas was forced by our government to promote
….. I cant say that now…. I pulled the paper out of planning immediately to see who bought the rigging and who put it on the board for inspection. The parts were not installed to allow ground crew to see if the door was secure.
I knew the guys, friends but not on our crew. Union also had a hand in it. I was there, forced by the company President, to go back to flight ramp and straighten it out. Complete mess. Incompetence. Senators were there, Tunney and Cranston. Plus FAA in force. Shit storm. I quit after 10 years, left after the storm subsided and
Well, I just finished college and left a promising promotion as I loathed the cover up. Yes, it was covered up. Real reason never told. PS… no one was held responsible as paperwork disappeared shortly thereafter. The reason was obvious if you knew the truth.

Loved the DC-10. The airplane in the Chicago accident was in control until the pilot followed the loss of engine checklist and slowed to V2+10. At the higher airspeed the aircraft was flyable. Later checklists called for staying at the higher airspeed if above V2+10.

On the 3rd of March 1974, a packed Turkish Airlines DC-10 was rocked by a tremendous explosion shortly after take off from Paris. A huge hole had opened up near the back of the cabin, throwing part of the floor, two rows of seats, and six passengers out into the sky. The pilots tried to save their crippled plane, but the pitch controls had been destroyed, sending the plane into an irrecoverable dive, and the jet crashed less than two minutes later in the Ermenonville Forest, killing all 346 passengers and crew.

I was working in in Des Plaines right outside the ORD fence when AA191 went down. Our building shook. Being so close to the airport we felt like we knew what it was before we went outside. Walked out the back door and saw the column of black smoke.

The placement of the third engine high up above the center line in the tail created high-roll inertia which made the aircraft inherently unstable and is probably the reason why so many DC-10/MD-11 that crashed ended up on their backs. I wonder if the AA DC10 that crashed in Chicago after losing it's left engine could have survived if the pilots did not have to counter the high roll inertia produced by the third engine.

By contrast the L1011's third engine was along the center line which was the safest location but this of course necessitated an S-duct for the air inlet which added cost and weight. The DC10 designers sacrificed safety for lower production/operation costs.

Safety considerations aside I always liked the "bad-ass" looks of the DC-10 especially in AA's bare-metal livery.

My first transatlantic flight was on a Lufthansa DC-10 in 1980. My last transatlantic flight was in 1997, and it was on an MD-11.

1. boeing 707
2. douglas DC-10
3. cessna 172

Some ironic parallels with what is going on at Boeing these days.

There was the DC10 flight 232 at Sioux City Ia. uncontained engine failure caused loss of all hydraulics. Tragic ending. I think there was some design changes after that one as well.

Good this airplane is heading to the scrap yard

crap article. too many detail errors to list, meaning I have no confidence in any of the conclusions stated.

Our United 232 had a remarkable experience. That was the last time that beast flew another UAL trip

The author should learn to write English and get his facts straight.

THE DC 10 OFTEN HAD CARGO DOOR ISSUES..A FEW COME TO MIND..ONE VERY PUBLICIZED ONE WAS A CARGO DOOR BLOWING OPEN AND A CASKET FALLING INTO A FIELD IN IOWA..THE OTHER SERIOUS ISSUES REMEMBERED SUCH AS AN ENGINE LITEREALLY COMING OFF UPON TAKEOFF IN CHICAGO AND THE HYDRAULICS CAUSING THE CRASH IN SIOUX CITY ALSO WERE D C 10 AIRCRAFT..I KIND OF HAVE A "SOFT SPOT" IN MY HEART FOR THAT AIRCRAFT HOWEVER,AS I ALWAYS ENJOYED WORKING WITH THAT AIRPLANE.MEETING IT AT THE GATE,HAVING THE EASE OF A TOGGLE SWITCH FOR DOOR OPENING AND CLOSING,THE ROOMY INTERIOR,AND ACTUALLY GETTING MY MOTHER TO GO ON A TRIP TO HAWAII ON A DC 10, WHEN SHE HAD NEVER FLOWN BEFORE!I ALSO REMEMBER A SADNESS (AFRTER EVERYON QUITE FLYING THEM), WHEN I SAW A FEW OF THESE AIRCRAFT FORM VARIOUS CARRIERS, AT A HANGER BASE WHERE THEY WERE BEING EITHER REFURBISHED AND SOLD FOR CARGO JETS, OR BEING TAKEN APART FOR PARTS..