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In 2005, Helios flight 522 crashed into a Greek hillside. Was it because one man forgot to flip a switch?
Early on the morning of 14 August 2005, Alan Irwin, then 44, was with his partner, Donna, and their two young children in an apartment in Larnaca, Cyprus. It was a convenient base, only minutes from the airport. Irwin was an aircraft engineer; he had become obsessed with the technical aspects of planes as a young man in the Royal Air Force, following in the footsteps of his father, also an aircraft engineer and pilot. “I enjoy being around machines,” Irwin says. “If they’re broken, they’re… (www.theguardian.com) 更多...[This poster has been suspended.]
True, but only on the ground!
To answer the question in the headline - the answer is NO, ABSOLUTELY NOT. At least 3 people "forgot to flip a switch", and the crew failed again at 12,000+ ft. The man on the ground is the least responsible.
I am dumbfounded how any reasonable person can find a party on the ground at fault for any incident short of a blatant attempt to carry out an act that is intended to interfere with the safety of flight. But, that can only apply to any control input that is not within reach or has an indicator provided to the flight crew.
So, that leaves one cause... failure to follow procedures and verify with the checklists from pre-start on forward.
This would not be the first time an incident took place because of checklist and procedural failure. Though they are much more rare there will likely be others regardless of how "safe" an airplane is designed and how "idiot proof" the engineers may try to make them.
The very last line of defense against any incident is... the human factor.
And, there is an issue when management places so much pressure upon the flight crew they are less likely to return when an issue appears in flight that cannot be resolved. Two things should always be the first option... to go around and after departure, put it back on the ground.
So, that leaves one cause... failure to follow procedures and verify with the checklists from pre-start on forward.
This would not be the first time an incident took place because of checklist and procedural failure. Though they are much more rare there will likely be others regardless of how "safe" an airplane is designed and how "idiot proof" the engineers may try to make them.
The very last line of defense against any incident is... the human factor.
And, there is an issue when management places so much pressure upon the flight crew they are less likely to return when an issue appears in flight that cannot be resolved. Two things should always be the first option... to go around and after departure, put it back on the ground.
Secondly, the fact that the cabin altitude warning shares an alarm with the config warning is not a secret nor is it unusual. Just like the trim cutout switch was not a secret on the Max. This is another case of pilots who were ill trained or complacent about their studies. In addition to the aural warning, there is also a Cabin Altitude annunciator light which they missed. It is inconveniently located on the overhead but a master caution light would also illuminate to call attention to a problem on the overhead panel.