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FAA demands that Boeing flight manuals give more detail on pilot emergency procedures
Boeing, under intensifying regulatory scrutiny after the fatal MAX crashes, has been directed by the Federal Aviation Administration to rework its flight manuals for both the 777X and MAX 10 to include detailed emergency pilot procedures. (www.seattletimes.com) 更多...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
If you read to the end of the article it says that in 2012 the FAA guidance was revised to “should be limited to the smallest practicable amount of material … that which is uniquely related to airplane safety or airworthiness.” In large part because airlines devise their own emergency procedures in line with the airplane flight manual. However since the FAA has no jurisdiction over foreign airlines they can’t verify that their procedures are adequate. So because both Max crashes were non US airlines and the feds and Boeing have much egg on their faces the FAA is now trying to act tough to (over)compensate.
I'm not sure if it could be done but I always enjoyed having that second officer in the cockpit during an emergency....me doing the shutdown (in this case) and him reading out procedures.
So, I'm wondering with the advancement of computer why not something like this: The computer tells you #2 engine has failed....the emergency is as following....voice saying #1....do this, #2....next step, #3 next step, #4 next step.
Maybe create an app we could download on our computer that would voice out the commands for various emergencies.
Just a thought from an old, bold and thank God alive Marine Pilot
So, I'm wondering with the advancement of computer why not something like this: The computer tells you #2 engine has failed....the emergency is as following....voice saying #1....do this, #2....next step, #3 next step, #4 next step.
Maybe create an app we could download on our computer that would voice out the commands for various emergencies.
Just a thought from an old, bold and thank God alive Marine Pilot
I'm sure that the last thing I flight crew would want is more noise in the cockpit. With alarms going off, and whatever noise, including likely spoken word suggestions 'PULL UP! PULL UP! TERRAIN! TERRAIN!' and stick shakers and warning bells and buzzes, Nope.
But, the 737 MAX crashes show that computer direct intervention isn't really an adequate solution either. Well, perhaps computer intervention that takes into account the entire situation, and doesn't try to drive the plane into the ground.
If anything, I'd thing that there should be a switch that will silence all current warnings, and only allow new warnings to be enunciated. It could give like a 10 second timed respite from the cacophony in an emergency and give the pilots time to think. Just an idea...
But, the 737 MAX crashes show that computer direct intervention isn't really an adequate solution either. Well, perhaps computer intervention that takes into account the entire situation, and doesn't try to drive the plane into the ground.
If anything, I'd thing that there should be a switch that will silence all current warnings, and only allow new warnings to be enunciated. It could give like a 10 second timed respite from the cacophony in an emergency and give the pilots time to think. Just an idea...
I think the point is that more crew training is the answer. Having procedures in place in the AFM is fine, but it is the crew that knows those procedures that will save you, not a crew that needs to read them.
But 'training is expensive' is a mantra in many business and industries. I owned a company that serviced IT assets in corporate environments, and too many of those corporations refused to send their employees to vendor training, seeing it as a 'waste of money'.
Boeing's denial of the differences in the MAX was likely a play for the industry to not require them to have to have to spend more money for training, and how much do you train, and the idea that requiring more training for essentially a 'model update' would likely raise questions about what the changes are, and should the plane be classified as a more radical change, and require more testing and verification, a VERY expensive problem for Boeing, who hoped that a 'fast and cheap' redesign of the 737 would save their investors, and their own jobs. I'm sure that someone in the bowels of Boeing knew that if the problems with the MAX came out, the push to cancel it, and spend millions to design it to fly without the bandaid, would grow and cost Boeing their future.
Boeing's denial of the differences in the MAX was likely a play for the industry to not require them to have to have to spend more money for training, and how much do you train, and the idea that requiring more training for essentially a 'model update' would likely raise questions about what the changes are, and should the plane be classified as a more radical change, and require more testing and verification, a VERY expensive problem for Boeing, who hoped that a 'fast and cheap' redesign of the 737 would save their investors, and their own jobs. I'm sure that someone in the bowels of Boeing knew that if the problems with the MAX came out, the push to cancel it, and spend millions to design it to fly without the bandaid, would grow and cost Boeing their future.
It's now widely known that the primary motivation for the appalling MCAS design was specifically Boeing's contract terms with Southwest for the MAX. There's evidently a $1 million per aircraft rebate that goes back to Southwest if pilots require any retraining.
In an amazing irony, pilots at various regulatory agencies throughout the world who've flown the MAX since the grounding have suggested that MCAS was not needed anyway, the aircraft's handling characteristics with the new engines are not significantly different than the NG.
The fear of triggering the Southwest rebate so infected and percolated through Boeing management (including their test pilots) that it created a kind of tunnel vision, group-think mentality.
In an amazing irony, pilots at various regulatory agencies throughout the world who've flown the MAX since the grounding have suggested that MCAS was not needed anyway, the aircraft's handling characteristics with the new engines are not significantly different than the NG.
The fear of triggering the Southwest rebate so infected and percolated through Boeing management (including their test pilots) that it created a kind of tunnel vision, group-think mentality.